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Constitutional Crisis in Pennsylvania:
Pennsylvania Supreme Court v.
Pennsylvania General Assembly
I. Introduction
Ever since Marbury v. Madison,' the American people have
looked to the judiciary as the guardian of their constitutional
rights? Spurred by a healthy mistrust of government and a
revulsion against tyranny, the founders of our country carefully
designed a system in which governmental power is divided between
three independent and co-equal branches with each branch held in
check by the others.' This separation of powers concept was so
fundamental to early American ideas of democratic government
that it was incorporated not only into the federal Constitution but
into all the state constitutions as well.4 The doctrine has been an
1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). In this landmark case, Chief Justice John Marshall
declared that the judiciary is the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution and may strike
down laws of Congress which, in the Court's opinion, are unconstitutional. See id.
2. See generally W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF
TlE UNITED STATES (1953); KERMIT L. HALL, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AMERICAN HISTORY:
MAJOR HISTORICAL INTERPRETATIONS (1987).
3. Like judicial review, the separation of powers doctrine is not explicitly stated in the
Constitution. However, it is considered implicit in articles I, II, and III which grant specific
powers to each branch. This separation, of course, is not absolute; the powers overlap to
afford each branch the ability to hold the others in check. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at
301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (explaining why it is necessary for each
branch of government to remain separate and distinct). "The accumulation of all powers,
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and
whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition
of tyranny." Id. The way to ensure that each branch is separate and independent, Madison
argues, is by "contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several
constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their
proper places." THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 320 (James Madison). See generally Gerhard
Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 30 Wm. &
MARY L. REV. 211 (1989) (discussing the development of the separation of powers doctrine).
4. The United States Supreme Court recently emphasized the importance of the
separation of powers doctrine in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211 (1995). Our system
of government, it stated, recognizes .'[the necessity of... the three great departments of
government ... [that] had been proclaimed and enforced by ... Blackstone, Jefferson and
Madison,' and had been 'sanctioned by the people of the United States, by being adopted
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essential part of Pennsylvania's government since the founding of
the commonwealth.5
The judiciary's role within this system is to uphold the will of
the people, as embodied in state and federal constitutions, by
defending those constitutions against attacks by coordinate
branches. To correct constitutional infractions by the legislature,
the judiciary wields the weapon of judicial review with which it
strikes down unconstitutional laws.
6
Like all political power, judicial review is subject to abuse. In
the hands of a politically avaricious court, it can be a sword as well
as a shield. Cloaked in the mantle of judicial review, under the
pretext of defending the constitution, a court can all too easily seize
power from the legislative branch by striking down a law merely
because it conflicts with the private policy preferences of the
members of the court.7
in terms more or less explicit, into all written constitutions."' Id. at 224 (quoting Bates v.
Kimball, 2 D. Chip. 77, 84 (Vt. 1824)).
5. The separation of powers doctrine is considered inherent in the following three
sections of the Pennsylvania Constitution: article It, § 1 (legislative branch); article IV, § 2
(executive branch); and article V, § I (judicial branch). See John M. Mulcahey, Separation
of Powers in Pennsylvania: The Judiciary's Prevention of Legislative Encroachment, 32 DUQ.
L. REV. 539, 540 (1994). The importance of separation of powers to Pennsylvania
government has been noted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See In re Investigation by
Dauphin County Grand Jury, 2 A.2d 804 (Pa. 1938). The court stated:
This separation appeared in Pennsylvania as early as 1776 in the Plan or Form of
Government for the Commonwealth or State of Pennsylvania, prepared by the
convention in that year. The separation was continued in our constitutions of
1790, of 1838, and of 1873.... [F]rom then until now, though the constitution has
been frequently amended, no effective effort has been made to change or take
away that power.
Id. at 807.
6. The concept of judicial review has always been controversial. Since it was first
introduced, during the colonial period, some have denounced it as anti-democratic.
Nonetheless, it has become soundly entrenched in the American system of 2overnment. See
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (stating that Marbury "declared the basic principle
that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that
principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and
indispensable feature of our constitutional system"). For a discussion of the arguments
against judicial review, see generally THOMAS J. HIGGINS, JUDICIAL REVIEW UNMASKED
(1981); ALBERT P. MELONE & GEORGE MACE, JUDICIAt. REVIEW AND THE AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY, 177-256 (1988); CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1986).
7. The danger that judges will advance their own political ideology is inherent in the
power of judicial review. Early Americans were well aware of this danger, and some argued
that the idea should be rejected for that reason. Alexander Hamilton and other advocates
of judicial review were convinced, however, that the judiciary would voluntarily refrain from
encroaching on legislative authority because of its "total incapacity to support its usurpations
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The American people have delegated broad policy-making
authority to the legislative branch, and the judiciary must permit
the legislature to exercise that power fully and freely. Only when
a legislature violates the federal or state constitution, therefore
frustrating the will of the people, should a court interfere.8 To
nullify a law for any other reason is itself a violation of the
constitution that courts are entrusted to protect.
What happens when a court violates the constitution? Ask the
people of Pennsylvania, whose highest court seems to have done
exactly that. In County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth,9 issued in
1987, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared the state's county-
based system of funding the courts of common pleas unconstitu-
tional and ordered the General Assembly to enact legislation
establishing a state-based funding system instead."0 Compliance
with this mandate would entail a complete transformation of the
manner in which Pennsylvania's county courts have been funded
for the past 200 years. Government spending, however, is a matter
by force," and because of the legislature's ability to impeach justices who step over the line,
THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 485 (Alexander Hamilton).
While it is true that these safeguards exist and may be employed to prevent a court
from exceeding the limits of judicial review, it is unfortunately not always clear exactly what
those limits are. In fact, prevailing views of how courts are to determine whether a law
violates a constitution vary widely, according to the personalities of the members of the court
and the political tenor of the times. During its more activist periods, the United States
Supreme Court interpreted the federal Constitution based on broad, murky concepts such
as liberty, due process, and equal protection. This provided plenty of room for the justices
to inject their own personal views and to further a particular political ideology. At other
times, the Court exercised more restraint and confined itself to interfering only when a law
clearly violated the plain meaning of the text of the Constitution. For an account of the
Court's vacillating approach to judicial review, see generally CROSSKEY, supra note 2;
SANFORD BYRAN GABIN, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE REASONABLE DOUBT TEST (1980);
HIGGINS, supra note 6; MELONE & MACE supra note 6; WOLFE, supra note 6.
Despite these dramatic judicial mood swings, the guiding principle behind judicial
review, as expressed by Alexander Hamilton, has remained fixed: Courts should only strike
down laws that violate the will of the people, as embodied in the federal and state
constitutions. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 464-72 (Alexander Hamilton).
8. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165-66, 170 (1803); THE
FEDERALIST No. 78, at 464-72 (Alexander Hamilton). This classic statement of the scope
of judicial review has been fully adopted in Pennsylvania. See Williams v. Samuel, 2 A.2d
834, 838 (Pa. 1939).
9. 534 A.2d 760 (Pa. 1987) (The following justices voted with the majority: Larsen,
Flaherty, Zappala, and Papadakos. Former Chief Justice Nix filed a dissenting opinion in
which Justice McDermott joined. Justice Papadakos dissented from the denial of reargument
in which Justices Nix and McDermott joined.).
10. See id. at 765.
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that has been unequivocally delegated to the General Assembly in
the Pennsylvania Constitution."
Had the court gone through the proper procedural paces and
provided a sound legal basis for its decision, this sweeping mandate
could more easily be accepted as a proper exercise of judicial
review. Instead, the court decided the case without the benefit of
an evidentiary record and even refused to allow input from the
General Assembly or the executive branch. Moreover, the opinion
announcing the decision is so brief, superficial, and unconvincing
that one can hardly help but conclude that the court pronounced
the current system unconstitutional merely in order to compel the
General Assembly to enact the state-funded system preferred by
the court.
Outraged at what they considered an invasion into their law-
making province, the Pennsylvania legislators ignored the man-
date. 2 For nine years, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refrained
from attempting to enforce the order even though it was asked to
do so on several occasions. 3 But suddenly 4 on July 26, 1996,
the court issued a writ of mandamus directing the General
Assembly to implement a state-funded court system by January 1,
1998. The court also appointed a special master to develop a
proposed design for the new system and a plan for its implementa-
11. PA. CONST. art. 1I, § 1. See also Beckert v. Warren, 439 A.2d 638, 642-43 (Pa. 1981)
("[Tlhe taxing and spending powers necessary to sustain the existence of the judiciary are
vested in the legislature."); Leahey v. Farrell, 66 A.2d 577, 579 (Pa. 1949) ("Control of state
finances rests with the legislature, subject only to constitutional limitations.").
12. The court stayed its judgment that the present system was unconstitutional in order
to give the General Assembly time to enact legislation establishing a state-funded system.
See Allegheny, 534 A.2d at 765.
13. In 1991, the court denied a motion filed by the County of Allegheny to lift the stay
and enforce the judgment. See County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth, No. 121 W.D. App.
Dkt. 1985 (Pa. Apr. 23, 1991). In 1993, the court denied a motion by the Pennsylvania State
Association of County Commissioners and the Counties of Allegheny, Beaver, Clarion,
Forest, Tioga, and Washington to enforce the judgment. See County of Allegheny v.
Commonwealth, 626 A.2d 492 (Pa. 1993). In Bradley v. Casey, 682 A.2d 773 (Pa. 1988), the
supreme court upheld the commonwealth court's decision in Bradley v. Casey, 547 A.2d 455
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988), and dismissed an action in mandamus to force the governor and
other state officials to obey the Allegheny order. Finally, in City and County of Philadelphia
v. Commonwealth, No. 89 E.D. Misc. Dkt. 1989 (Pa. Mar. 31, 1989), the court dismissed
another mandamus action to force compliance.
14. The decision did not come as a complete surprise because the Philadelphia Inquirer
had previously predicted it, based on leaked information. See infra note 41 and accom-
panying text.
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tion. 5  The legislators bristled. Members of both chambers
publicly vowed to disregard the order. 6 The leaders of the House
of Representatives and Senate filed a petition for review 17 asking
the court to reconsider. Given the strong language of the court's
opinion and order,18 along with the court's history of demanding
exclusive control over all matters affecting the judiciary,9 it is
unlikely that the court will retract the mandate. Whether the
General Assembly will obey it remains to be seen.
The Allegheny decision has placed Pennsylvania on the brink
of a constitutional crisis. Unless one side backs down, the standoff
between the state's high court and legislature could erupt into a
full-blown war with bloody battles. Pushed to discharge the full
force of its power, the court could attempt to enforce its mandate
by imposing contempt sanctions and ordering that the legislators be
fined or imprisoned. The General Assembly, in retaliation, could
play its constitutional trump card and institute impeachment
proceedings against the errant justices."°
This comment analyzes the impending impasse and concludes
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has wrongly used judicial
15. See Pennsylvania State Ass'n of County Comm'rs v. Commonwealth, 681 A.2d 699
(Pa. 1996) [hereinafter PSACC]. This opinion and order was issued in response to an action
for writ of mandamus filed more than three years earlier asking the court to compel the
Commonwealth and General Assembly to fund the county courts. See Pennsylvania State
Ass'n of County Comm'rs v. Commonwealth, No. 112 W.D. Misc. Dkt. 1992 (Pa. Dec. 7,
1992).
16. See infra notes 149-54 and accompanying text (discussing the various responses to
the PSACC mandate that have been proposed by members of the General Assembly).
These responses include refusing to obey the court's order, refusing to fund the special
master's study specified by the court in PSACC, changing the Pennsylvania Constitution to
decrease the court's power, working to replace the current system of judicial election with
judicial appointment, and impeaching the justices.
17. See Jubelier v. Administrative Office of the Pa. Courts, No. 130 W.D. Misc. Dkt.
1996 (Pa. Aug. 3, 1996).
18. The court concluded by stating:
Because this court has attempted to act cooperatively with the General Assembly
and has devied prior petitions for encorcement, allowing the General Assembly
a period of nine years to enact a funding scheme which would provide the
necessary financial support for state courts, and because the General Assembly has
failed to act within this extended reasonable period of time, we now grant
petitioner's request for a writ of mandamus.
PSACC, 681 A.2d at 703.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 116-37.
20. This would include Chief Justice Flaherty and Justices Zappala, Newman, Nigro, and
Cappy; Justice Castille dissented along with former Chief Justice Nix, who has since retired.
See generally PSACC, 681 A.2d at 699.
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review to tip the balance of powers in its favor and that this
balance must be restored. Therefore, if the court will not retract
its mandate, the General Assembly has a duty to refuse to comply
with the order and take whatever steps are necessary to correct the
infraction.
Such a response would undoubtedly cause the court embarrass-
ment as well as some loss of integrity. However, the alternative is
even more ominous. To stand by and permit the court to usurp
power from a co-equal branch would encourage similar violations
in the future. If the Pennsylvania Supreme Court continues to
exhibit a lack of proper judicial restraint and deference to the
General Assembly and is never called to task for it, Pennsylvania
could possibly find itself with a runaway high court that freely
misappropriates power from other branches and is accountable to
no one.
Moreover, allowing the violation to go uncorrected would
frustrate the will of the people of Pennsylvania, who have delegated
law-making authority to the General Assembly."' Because the
members of the General Assembly represent the people of
Pennsylvania, it is essentially our decision.22 By usurping the
General Assembly's legislative power on this issue, the court has
deprived us of the right to make this important determination.
The battle of wills between the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
and the Pennsylvania General Assembly is not merely a fight over
how the courts of Pennsylvania will be funded. It is a struggle over
who should decide how the courts of Pennsylvania will be funded.
It is, quite simply, a power struggle. And the Pennsylvania
Constitution is clear on which side should prevail: decisions
regarding government spending have been delegated to the
legislature, rather than the judiciary.23 Permitting one branch of
government to seize power from another would undermine the
system of checks and balances that we rely on to prevent excessive
power accumulation by any one branch. Such constitutional
violations must not be tolerated, even-and especially-when
committed by the state's highest court.
21. See PA. CONST. art. II, § 1.
22. See In re Likins' Petition, 37 Pa. Super. 625, 626 (1908) (stating that the legislature
represents the will of the people).
23, See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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II. Analysis of the Impending Impasse
A. How Did We Get Into This Mess?: The Procedural Back-
ground
Historically, each county in Pennsylvania has been responsible
for funding the court of common pleas within its jurisdiction, and
this obligation has been imposed by statute.24 The counties
provide full funding of all staff and other expenses necessary for
the operation of the courts with the exception of judicial salaries
and $70,000 per authorized judgeship, which is provided by the
state.
25
In 1985, the County of Allegheny sought to shift the entire
responsibility to the state. It filed suit for declaratory judgment in
the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court against the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania requesting a determination of whether the state
must fund the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County and
all other courts of common pleas.26 The county argued that the
current funding scheme violated the Pennsylvania Constitution's
mandate for a "unified judicial system"'27 because it produced a
decentralized, fragmented system that spurs funding disputes
between county officials, court administrators, and judges.28 The
commonwealth court sustained the Commonwealth's preliminary
objections and dismissed the action, ruling that the case was non-
justiciable because control of the state's finances had been
constitutionally assigned to the legislature. 9 On appeal, however,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the General Assembly's
actions are subject to constitutional limitations and that the
judiciary had the authority to determine whether the statutes
requiring the counties to fund the courts in their districts violated
24. See infra note 35 and accompanying test.
25. See Pa. Laws 2A.
26. See County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth, 500 A.2d 1267 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985),
rev'd, 534 A.2d 760 (Pa. 1987).
27. PA. CONST. art. V, § 1. That section of the Pennsylvania Constitution states: "The
judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a unified judicial system .... All
courts and justices of the peace and their jurisdiction shall be in this unified judicial system."
Id.
28. Allegheny County also contended that the counties were not required to fund the
courts, but this argument was rejected. See Allegheny, 500 A.2d at 1269.
29. See id. at 1268-69.
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the Pennsylvania Constitution." The court then went on to
decide the issue even though there was no evidentiary record
because the commonwealth court had decided the case on prelimi-
nary objections."
Because the question to be resolved was whether the current
system of funding violated the Pennsylvania Constitution's mandate
for a "unified judicial system,"32 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's primary task was to determine what "unified" meant. With
the help of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, the court
interpreted the word to mean "harmonious."33  The court then
found that the current funding scheme violated the constitution
because it produced a system filled with friction, dissension,
antagonism, and strife)4
Although the court declared the statutes establishing the
current system to be void,35 it stayed the judgment in order to give
the General Assembly time to enact legislation implementing state-
wide funding. The present system was to remain in place during
the interim.36 That proved to be far longer than the court antici-
pated as the General Assembly completely ignored the order.
Throughout the next nine years, while the court declined to either
enforce or revoke its mandate, the decision languished in limbo.
The General Assembly's blatant disregard of the order placed the
court in an awkward and embarrassing position. In 1993, when the
court fen'ecf a motfon to enforce tfie Af(egheny jhbcgment, tfiree
justices dissented: Chief Justice Nix, who had previously dissented
in Allegheny, called the order "unenforceable," and argued that it
should be revoked;38 Justice Papadakos advocated enforcing the
mandate;39 and Justice Larsen urged his colleagues to take some
sort of decisive action-one way or the other.'
30. See Allegheny, 534 A.2d at 762.
31. See infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
32 See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
33. Allegheny, 534 A.2d at 763.
34. See id. at 763-64.
35. See id. at 762-63.
36. See Allegheny, 534 A.2d at 765.
37. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
38. See County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth, 626 A.2d 492,493 (Pa. 1993) (Nix, C.,
dissenting).
39. See id. (Papadakos, J., dissenting).
40. See id. (Larsen, J., dissenting).
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The court, however, declined to act. The tortured silence
lasted nearly a decade. Then, out of the blue, on April 14, 1996,
the Philadelphia Inquirer announced that the court planned to
resurrect its decision and enforce the mandate." Three months
later, this forecast proved to be accurate. On July 26, 1996, the
court issued its response to a petition for :iandamus filed more
than three years earlier by the Pennsylvania State Association of
County Commissioners42 ai d ten counties.43 In the PSACC
order and opinion, the court granted the writ of mandamus and
directed the General Assembly to enact a funding system that
complied with the Allegheny decision.44 The court also appointed
Senior Pennsylvania Superior Court Judge (and former Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court Justice) Frank J. Montemuro as special
master to prepare a proposal designing the new system and
developing a plan for the transition.45
On August 23, 1996, the leaders of the Pennsylvania Senate
and House of Representatives filed a petition for review of PSACC
asking the court to vacate its order and schedule a hearing at which
evidence could be presented.46 The petitioners argued that the
decision was procedurally defective because the General Assembly
had been denied the opportunity to participate in the Allegheny
proceedings and because the court had rendered its decision
without any factual record.47 The petitioners also argued that the
Allegheny decision was based on an erroneous interpretation of the
term "unified" and ihat the mandate interfered with the General
Assembly's taxing and spending power.4"
The County Commissioners Association of Pennsylvania
intervened in the case and filed a motion to quash the petition for
41. See Robert Zausner & Russell E. Eshelman, Pa. Faces Change in Court Funding,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 14, 1996, at Al.
42. See Pennsylvania State Ass'n of County Comm'rs v. Commonwealth, No. 112 W.D.
App. Dkt. 1992 (',e. Dec. 7, 1992).
43. The follo . ,ng counties joined the action as plaintiffs: Bucks, Cumberland, Dauphin,
Erie, Forest, Fulton, Monroe, Snyder, and Tioga. See Pennsylvania State Ass'n of County
Comm'rs v. Commonwealth, 681 A,2d 699, 699 (Pa, 1996).
44. See id. at 700.
45. See id. at 699.
46. See Petition for Review, Jubelier v. Administrative Office of the Pa. Courts, No. 130
W.D. Misc. Dkt. 1996 (Pa. Aug. 23, 1996).
47. See id. at 13-15, 20-24.
48. See id. at 16-20, 24-27.
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review.4 On October 15, 1996, the court denied the request to
vacate the PSACC order, deferred a decision on the motion to
quash the petition, and ordered that briefs be submitted addressing
the question of whether the decision should be reviewed by the
court."0 The court has not yet rendered a decision on the petition
for review, and the General Assembly has taken no steps to comply
with the mandate.
In the meantime, Judge Montemuro has completed his report
and submitted it to the court for adoption.51 The master's master
plan envisions a massive absorption into the state system of
virtually all people, places, and things associated with the county
courts and sets out a timetable for the take-over. 2 Not surpris-
ingly, the report advocates the creation of a huge and complex
bureaucracy to administer the system with the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court at the helm. 3
The court has not yet officially approved the report, but it did
approve a line item in Governor Tom Ridge's budget proposal to
fund the first phase of the takeover which indicates that the court
has not changed its mind on the mandate. 4 The proposal desig-
nates 15.1 million dollars to pay the salaries and benefits of court
administrators across the state and to cover the cost of linking these
offices to a state data system.55 Several legislators have indicated
that the proposal will be a major point of contention in this year's
budget battle. 6
The dispute between the court and the General Assembly will
surely come to a head in the immediate future when the state
budget is passed. The General Assembly will be forced to either
49. See Notice of Intervention and Motion to Quash Petition for Review, Jubelier v.
Administrative Office of the Pa. Courts, No. 130 W.D. Misc. Dkt. 1996 (Pa. Sept. 23, 1996),
50. See Jubelier v. Administrative Office of the Pa. Courts, No. 130 W.D. Misc. Dkt.
1996 (Pa. Oct. 15, 1996) (denying request to vacate order and directing submission of briefs).
51. See Frank J. Montemuro, Jr., Interim Report of the Master on the Transition to State
Funding of the Unified Judicial System, No. 112 W.D. Misc. Dkt. 1992 (Pa. Dec. 7, 1992)
(filed July 31, 1997).
52. See id.
53. See id.
54, See State Takeover of Court System Growing Imminent, WILLIAMSPORT SUN-
GAZETTE, Feb. 8, 1998, at A4.
55. See id.
56. See State Funding for County Courts an Unwanted Precedent?, WILLIAMSPORT SUN-
GAZEVTE, Feb. 5, 1998, at Al (comments of Senator Roger Madigan and Representatives
Thomas Dempsey and Brett Feese).
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muscle under and approve the request or stand its ground and
repulse the attack.
B. Who Asked the Court Anyway? Is the Issue Justiciable?
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, whose iuling was
overturned by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Allegheny,
concluded that the General Assembly's choice of an individual
funding mechanism was none of the court's business and dismissed
the matter on preliminary objections. 7 Noting that the General
Assembly "has been given the constitutional power to determine
what [governmental] programs will be adopted... and how they
will be financed,"58 and finding that this power was unaffected by
the creation of a "unified judicial system" at the 1968 Pennsylvania
Constitutional Convention,59 the commonwealth court concluded
that the issue raised in the case was non-justiciable because there
is "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate governmental branch and impossibility of an
appropriate judicial remedy."'
The problem with this conclusion is that the commonwealth
court was not asked to determine the best way to fund the county
courts but merely whether the system designed by the General
Assembly was unconstitutional-a decision which it had the power
and the duty to make.6 As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
correctly pointed out, the General Assembly's authority to control
fiscal matters is subject to constitutional restrictions, and it is the
judiciary's responsibility to determine whether those limits have
been crossed.62 Ironically, in making this determination, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court exceeded its own constitutional
limitations.
57. See County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth, 500 A.2d 1267 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985).
58. Id. at 1269 (citing Shapp v. Sloan, 391 A.2d 595, 604 (Pa. 1978)).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. In Commonwealth v, Zasloff, 13 A.2d 67 (Pa. 1940), the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court summarized this principle by stating:
While it is for the legislative branch of government to enact such measures as it
deems desirable for the advancement of the public welfare, the judiciary is the
ultimate authority to determine whether constitutional restraints have been
violated, confining itself, of course, to the question, not of legislative policy, but
of legislative power.
Id. at 69.
62. See County of Allegbeny v. Commonwealth, 534 A.2d 760, 762 (Pa. 1987).
1997]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
C Breaking the Rules of Review: Anatomy of a Power Grab
The guidelines governing the exercise of judicial review in
Pennsylvania emanate from article II, section 1 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution which grants to the General Assembly "[t]he legisla-
tive power of this Constitution."'63 Early in the state's history, the
courts interpreted this power to be very broad, limited only by the
state and federal constitutions.64 Courts are to determine only
whether the legislature has exceeded these limitations by passing an
unconstitutional law.
65
Pennsylvania case law is very clear on how courts are to
evaluate legislation. Because the actions of the General Assembly
represent the will of the people, its laws enjoy a strong presumption
of constitutionality; therefore, a party challenging a law bears a
heavy burden of persuasion to prove otherwise.66 Courts may
declare a statute invalid only if it "clearly, palpably, and plainly"
violates the constitution.67 When there is any doubt as to whether
a law is unconstitutional, courts are to give the General Assembly
the benefit of the doubt and uphold the law.68 These guidelines
exist in order to prevent the judiciary from using its power of
judicial review to act as a super-legislature, striking down laws
merely because they conflict with the private policy preferences of
the justices.
Unfortunately, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not follow
these guidelines in Allegheny. Instead, it found a constitutional
violation where none clearly existed, apparently to force the
General Assembly to enact the state-funded system preferred by a
majority of the members of the court.
Allegheny involved the interpretation of article V, section 1 of
the Pennsylvania Constitution, which states:
63. PA. CONsT. art. II, § 1.
64. See Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 2 Rawle 369 (Pa. 1830).
65. See Zasloff, 13 A.2d at 69 (stating that judicial review is limited to the question of
legislative power, not policy).
66. See Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd. v. Spa Athletic Club, 485 A.2d 732, 734 (Pa.
1984). See also James v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 477 A.2d 1302, 1304 (Pa. 1984).
67. Daly v. Hemphill, 191 A,2d 835, 840 (Pa. 1963).
68. See Consumer Party of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 507 A.2d 323, 331-32 (Pa. 1986)
(quoting Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 485 A.2d at 734)); Williams v. Samuel, 2 A.2d
834, 838 (Pa. 1939).
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The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a
unified judicial system consisting of the Supreme Court, the
Superior Court, the Commonwealth Court, courts of common
pleas, community courts, municipal and traffic courts in the City
of Philadelphia, such other courts as may be provided by law
and justices of the peace. All courts and justices of the peace
and their jurisdiction shall be in this unified judicial system.69
Because Allegheny County had argued that the county-based
funding scheme did not create a "unified judicial system," the case
turned on the meaning of that phrase and, in particular, of the
word "unified."
The logical starting point for interpreting "unified judicial
system" is to review the proceedings of the 1967-68 Constitutional
Convention where the provision containing this phrase was
proposed. Instead, the court turned to Webster's Third New
International Dictionary, which conveniently provided several
definitions from which to choose.7' Not surprisingly, the court
selected the one defining "unify" as "to cause to be one: make into
a coherent group or whole: give unity to: harmonize,"" and then
proceeded to find that the current system was not harmonious and,
therefore, violated article V, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion."
Had the court actually considered the proceedings of the
Constitutional Convention, it would have been constrained to
conclude that the purpose of the new language was to achieve a
basic level of administrative unification which was sorely lacking at
that time. Prior to the passage of amended article V, section 1,
Pennsylvania's courts were totally isolated from one another with
no supervisory or administrative authority to impose consistency in
practices. The system has been described as:
... [A]rchaic, not to say chaotic. At the appellate level, the
supreme and superior courts were administratively totally
independent of each other. At the county trial level, each
district was a judicial fiefdom with its own jealously guarded
prerogatives. Within these districts existed "a bewildering
69. PA, CONST. art. V, § I (emphasis added).
70. See County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth, 534 A.2d 760, 763 (Pa. 1987).
71. Id.
72. See id. at 764.
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patchwork of courts with overlapping jurisdiction, unsupervised
operations, and, often, ill-trained personnel."73
The Preparatory Committee for the 1967-68 Constitutional
Convention, which provided the delegates with background
materials on the issues to be considered at the Convention,
described the distinguishing feature of the proposed "unified
judicial system" as "uniform jurisdiction and centralized control and
responsibility."74 This language caused Justice Castille to conclude
in his PSACC dissent:
[T]he constitutional mandate for a unified judicial court system
is satisfied when the lines of authority flow from the Supreme
Court to the local courts and where the high court thereby
possesses administrative responsibility over those lower courts
in the Pennsylvania court system. Such an arrangement
presently exists and satisfies the mandates of Article 5."
The issue of court financing was mentioned only briefly in the
Convention's preparatory materials, where it was noted that
historically each county paid its own court costs but that some
favored a state-based funding system.7 6 Throughout the Conven-
tion, the delegates never discussed the possibility of changing the
system. Court funding issues were raised only in relation to the
concern over maintaining the separation of powers between the
legislature and the judiciary. During this discussion, the delegates
flatly rejected the suggestion that the supreme court should be
involved in the hiring and payment of county court staff.77 The
fact that the delegates chose not to even address the possibility of
reorganizing the funding system of the Pennsylvania courts
73. Thomas W. Pomeroy, Jr., Foreword: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Its First
Decade Under the New Judiciary Article, 53 TEMP. L. REV. 613, 616 n.12 (1980) (referring
generally to S. SCHULMAN, TOWARDS JUDICIAL REFORM IN PENNSYLVANIA (1962)).
74. PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL PREPARATORY COMMITTEE, REFERENCE
MANUAL No. 5, TIE JUDICIARY 51 (1967). The other characteristics listed were: a single
court in which all judicial power is concentrated, a centralization of power in a high court
to assign judges to work in needed areas, a system in which all judges are learned in the law,
and a delegation of rule making power to a high court. See id, at 51-52.
75, Pennsylvania State Ass'n of County Comm'rs v. Commonwealth, 681 A.2d 699, 708
(Pa. 1996) (Castille, J., dissenting). Justice Castille was not a member of the court at the
time Allegheny was decided. See Allegheny, 534 A.2d at 760.
76. See PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL PREPARATORY COMMITTEE, supra note 74,
at 230.
77. See 2 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEBATES OF THE PA. CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION, 1967-68, at 1369-71 (1969).
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indicates their intention for the current system to remain in
place. 8 In short, the history of the Convention demonstrates that
the phrase "unified judicial system" was inserted into the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution to unify the state judiciary under the administra-
tive authority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. It was not
intended to alter the current funding method, nor to permit a
wholesale take-over of all county judicial functions by the state.
Unfortunately, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ignored the
historical context of the adoption of the "unified judicial system"
and interpreted the word "unified" in a vacuum, aided only by a
dictionary.79 Instead of being faithful to the intentions of the
Constitutional Convention delegates, who represent the will of the
people of Pennsylvania, 0 the court chose the meaning that best
served its own purposes.
The court also did not seek input from the General Assembly
on the issue. While neither the General Assembly nor the
Governor were parties to Allegheny, the General Assembly did file
an application for leave to intervene in the proceedings after the
decision was announced but prior to the deadline for requesting
reargument. 'The Governor also filed an application for leave to
intervene. Both applications were denied.8 Justice Papadakos,
joined by Chief Justice Nix and Justice McDermit, dissented from
the exclusion of the other two branches. He wrote:
I believe that in the spirit of comity among equal branches of
government that the Applications of the Governor and the
General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
should be granted and we should permit them to argue their
positions (in Harrisburg) vis-a-vis the Constitutional argument
that they provide full funding for the entire unified Judicial
System of Pennsylvania.82
78. Justice Castille reached a similar conclusion in his PSACC dissent: "Because it
appears that the delegates intentionally omitted the funding of the unified judiciary, I believe
that it was improper for the majority [in Allegheny] to supply such an omission." PSACC,
681 A.2d at 708 n.2. (Castille, J., dissenting).
79. The meaning of the word "unified" was not the focus of the briefs in Allegheny.
80. See In re Likens' Petition, 37 Pa. Super. 625, 626 (1908).
81. See County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth, No. 121 W.D. App. Dkt. 1985 (Pa. Jan,
19, 1988).




But even if we were to accept the court's interpretation of
"unified" as "harmonious," the court was still not justified in
finding that the current system violated the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion. Because the commonwealth court had dismissed the case on
preliminary objections, its ruling was based solely on the pleadings.
There had been no evidentiary hearing, nor was there any factual
record upon which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court could base its
ruling. Yet, the court proceeded to decide the case anyway and
offered the following justification:
Ordinarily, we would remand for trial a case erroneously
decided upon preliminary objections, but in this case Common-
wealth Court also addressed the merits and resolved them
against the County. Since the record is complete and we are
required only to address legal, not factual questions, we will
treat the case as having been decided upon the merits below.'
The problem with the court's reasoning is that the common-
wealth court did not address the merits of the case. It concluded
only that the addition of the unified judicial system provision to the
constitution in 1968 did not affect the issue of court funding and,
therefore, the judiciary had no right to question the legislature's
judgment on the matter.8  The commonwealth court never
addressed the question of whether the funding scheme chosen by
the General Assembly had produced a court system at odds with
the constitution's mandate for a "unified judicial system." The
court also failed to hear evidence on whether the system was
fraught with dissension and conflict. So, in spite of the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court's assertion to the contrary, the decision did
require factual findings and the court proceeded without hesitation
to make them. Former Chief Justice Nix,85 Justice Castille, and
Justice Newman have all objected to the inadequate basis upon
which the court made these findings and rendered its decision.86
Despite this lack of evidence, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
found that there was a "history of strife" between the various
83. Id. at 762.
84. See County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth, 500 A.2d 1267, 1270 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1985).
85. See Allegheny, 534 A.2d at 767 (Nix, C.J., dissenting).
86. See Pennsylvania State Ass'n of County Comm'rs v. Commonwealth, 681 A.2d 699,
708 (Pa. 1996) (Castille, J., dissenting); id. at 706 (Newman, J., concurring). Justices Castille
and Newman were not members of the supreme court when Allegheny was decided. See
Allegheny, 534 A.2d at 760.
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judicial districts and the counties over funding matters and that the
current system was "characterized by management and fiscal
disagreements which periodically culminate in litigation in which
the various counties and the courts within them are set off against
each other as antagonists. "" The court cited the three instances
listed by the county in its brief involving disagreements over: (1)
the scope of the bargaining power of the Allegheny County
Commissioners; (2) whether the Allegheny County Salary Board
had the authority to reject labor arbitration awards; and (3)
whether Allegheny County's mandatory retirement system should
apply to court employees.8" However, as former Chief Justice Nix
correctly pointed out in his dissent, those disputes resulted from
uncertainties regarding the relationship between the parties, and
the decisions rendered by the court primarily clarified the para-
meters of those relationships. He concluded: "[I]t is inaccurate to
contend that the differences brought to light and resolved in those
isolated lawsuits establish the existence of an irreconcilable state-
wide breakdown of the local funding process."89
To further support its conclusion that the current system was
fraught with conflict, the court cited three cases in which county
courts brought actions against county government officials to
increase funding.9" In Leahy v. Farrell,9 the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court denied the county court's request for additional
funding because it had never requested an increase from the county
salary board. In the other two cases, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that additional funds were necessary and ordered the
counties to provide them.92
Although these examples involve instances of conflict between
the county officials and the courts, it is nonetheless too scant a
body of evidence upon which to generalize that the entire system
is plagued with dissension and strife. When viewed within the
context of the two hundred year history of the commonwealth,
three cases do not prove that Pennsylvania's judicial system is so
impaired by conflict that it violates that constitution. On the
87 Allegheny, 534 A.2d at 764.
88. See id.
89. Id. at 767 (Nix, CJ., dissenting).
90. See id. at 764.
91, 66 A.2d 577 (Pa. 1949).
92. See Beckert v. Warren, 439 A,2d 638 (Pa. 1981); Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v.
Tate, 274 A.2d 193 (Pa. 1971).
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contrary, the small number of disputes that have reached the
appellate courts tends to indicate that the current system is
functioning quite well. Far from pointing out a deficiency in the
current system, these cases demonstrate that when a serious
funding conflict does arise, there is an effective, built-in safeguard
that protects courts from being crippled through fiscal control by
their funding bodies. When a court proves that it has inadequate
funds to operate, the appellate courts may compel the counties to
appropriate the necessary funds.9' Nonetheless, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court concluded that the current system violated the
Pennsylvania Constitution's mandate for a unified judicial system
because the relationship between the judicial branch and the county
governments was "neither harmonious nor unified, but rather,
fragmented."94
The court's decision in Allegheny was reached only by violating
the long-standing rules of judicial review in Pennsylvania. Absent
a clear constitutional violation, the court should have respected the
judgment of the General Assembly on the matter. The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court has itself stated: "[I]t is the duty of every
judge ... to search for a construction which will support the
legislative interpretation of the Constitution and an act can never
be declared void unless this is found impossible."95
The justices in the majority did not fulfill this duty in Alle-
gheny.96 Instead, they employed a strained and artificial interpre-
tation of the Pennsylvania Constitution and made factual findings
upon scant and flimsy evidence without the benefit of a factual
record or evidentiary hearing. The court's blatant departure from
these guidelines suggests that its goal was not to impartially
evaluate the constitutionality of the present system but rather to
force the General Assembly to enact a new state-wide funding
system.
93. See infra note 132 and accompanying text (discussing the inherent power of the
courts to compel funding).
94. Allegheny, 534 A.2d at 764,
95. Commonwealth ex rel, Schnader v, Liveright, 161 A, 697, 703 (Pa. 1932).
96. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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D. Making Law Instead of Interpreting It: An Opinion That
Should Have Been Kept to Itself
It is evident from the Allegheny opinion that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court prefers a state-funded judiciary. The court,
however, has neither the expertise nor the authority to make that
decision. In Allegheny, the court's duty was to determine only
whether the current system of court funding was a constitutionally
valid method-not whether it was the best method.97
The Pennsylvania Constitution assigns authority to determine
how funds are raised and spent to the legislative branch for good
reason.9" Restructuring the state's court funding system is an
enormous undertaking that would involve major changes in the way
the state raises and spends revenue. The people of Pennsylvania,
who provide that revenue, should have input into these important
decisions. The legislative process is designed to enable the elected
representatives to ascertain and implement the will of the people.
It provides an open forum for the debate and resolution of public
policy issues with extensive opportunity for public input. Individ-
uals also have the opportunity to express their views through
personal contact with their representatives.
Moreover, the General Assembly is directly accountable to the
public because its members are subject to frequent re-election.
Pennsylvania judges, however, are elected every ten years. This
occurs primarily through a retention ballot, on which the judges run
unopposed in low-key elections that generate little interest among
the general public.
The legislative branch is also in a better position to decide this
type of fiscal matter than are Pennsylvania judges because it has
the ability, resources, and expertise to research and explore factual
issues. The legislature also has the flexibility to alter, amend, or
repeal statutes that fail to work as anticipated. Courts, by contrast,
do not receive public input, are extremely limited in their fact-
97, See generally Appeal of Lieb, 116 A.2d 860, 866 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1955) (stating that
the question for the court is not whether the legislature has selected the best possible means
of achieving the desired result); Spotts v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 109
A,2d 212, 215 (Pa. 1955) (stating that "[tihe wisdom and appropriateness of legislation" are
not questions for the judicial branch); Williams v. Samuel, 2 A.2d 834, 838 (Pa. 1939) (stating
that in evaluating the constitutionality of a statute, the court neither commends nor questions
the wisdom of the law).
98. See supra note 11 (taxing and spending assigned to legislative branch).
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finding abilities, are hindered by stare decisis, and may only decide
controversies properly brought before them.
For all these reasons, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court should
not attempt to question or evaluate the wisdom of the current
system, nor should it attempt to impose its preference for state-
wide funding upon the people of Pennsylvania. The General
Assembly should make that decision, for it is in the best position
to evaluate the current system, study alternatives, and seek
extensive input from county governments, courts, and taxpayers.
E. Centralized Versus Localized: Is Bigger Better?
The complex and politically charged issues that arise when
designing a funding mechanism for Pennsylvania's courts clearly
demonstrate why the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is not the
appropriate branch to make such decisions. Judge Montemuro's
plan envisions a system whereby the budgets of each court would
be set by a state bureaucratic substructure of the Administrative
Office of the Pennsylvania Courts, which is ultimately controlled by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The court obviously believes that
centralizing control over judicial administration would create a
more harmonious, efficient, and consistent justice system.99 But
it is not at all clear that changing the funding system would bring
about these results.
To begin with, it is far from obvious that a state-funded system
would eliminate or even reduce funding conflicts. In all probabil-
ity, the battles would merely move from the county to the state
level. Disagreements over funding are simply unavoidable in a
system in which one governmental branch allocates money for
another. However, such disputes are not necessarily undesirable.
In fact, to a certain extent they are downright healthy because they
force the judiciary to justify its expenses. Tension over funding is
the natural and inevitable result when budget requests are
objectively evaluated rather than rubber-stamped.
Indeed, the judiciary's dependence on the legislative branch for
funding is an important part of the balance of powers structure.","
99. See Allegheny, 534 A.2d at 764-65.
100. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (discuss-
ing the system of checks and balances that restrain each branch from usurping power from
the others). Justice Castille, in his dissent in PSACC, raised this point:
The result reached by the majority opinion would eliminate the legislative branch's
responsibility for enacting legislation that properly raises and efficiently expends
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As Justice Castille argues in his PSACC dissent, this inherent
tension does not warrant the wholesale elimination of the current
funding scheme, nor does it justify the court's "assuming the power
unto itself to determine the funding level of the unified judicial
system and then unilaterally imposing that determination on the
legislative branch, thereby eliminating an important check on the
judicial branch by the legislative branch. This is the very definition
of judicial tyranny."101
It is also highly questionable whether centralizing all judicial
operations, as Judge Montemuro advocates, t" will result in a
more efficient use of funds. The master's master plan would shift
over to state control practically all people and things associated
with the county courts and would create a mind-boggling bureau-
cracy to administer the system.'0 3 The sheer complexity and
massiveness of this scheme raise serious doubts as to whether it will
actually be more efficient than the piesent system where the power
and control lie at the local level.
revenue and would transfer this expenditure responsibility totally to the judicial
branch, thus eliminating a vital check and balance between these two co-equal
branches of the government. Such usurpation of authority provides the judicial
branch with unfettered power to spend revenue as it sees fit in the name of a
unified judicial system without being directly answerable to the source of the
revenue, the citizens, if such revenue is not spent wisely or efficiently. Such an
egregious action drastically upsets the checks and balances of our scheme of
government.
Pennsylvania State Ass'n of County Comm'rs v. Commonwealth, 681 A.2d 699, 709 (Pa.
1996) (Castille, J., dissenting).
101. PSACC, 681 A.2d at 709 (Castille, J., dissenting).
102. See generally Montemuro, supra note 51.
103. See generally id. Under the plan, the following county personnel would be trans-
ferred to the state system: common pleas judges and their personal staffs; district justices and
their staffs; Pittsburgh Magistrates Court, Philadelphia Municipal Court and Traffic Court
judges and their staffs; court reporters; data processing personnel; masters; hearing officers;
arbitrators; parajudicial officials; and administrative support staff. It would also include
personnel employed in the following offices: domestic relations, adult and juvenile probation
and parole, investigative and diagnostic services, law libraries, clerk of courts, prothonotary,
clerk of the orphans court, and register of wills. Virtually the only court-associated
employees who would not be absorbed into the state system are those who work in the
offices of the sheriffs, the District Attorneys, and the Public Defenders.
The state would take over the following duties, with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
ultimately in charge: managing of personnel, which includes establishing policies, procedures,
job classifications, salary levels, staffing requirements, and employee benefits; developing
budgets for all county courts; purchasing all items; auditing; accounting; establishing policies
for all matters affecting the unified judicial system; and promulgating a set of court rules to
replace all local rules. County property currently in use by the courts, such as office
furniture, and computers, would become the property of the state.
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After all, bigger does not necessarily mean better. It is
entirely possible that the counties-not the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court or its administrative agency-can best determine what their
needs are and how to meet them. Pennsylvania is a highly diverse
state with both rural and metropolitan areas; costs and needs vary
widely according to the unique set of circumstances present in each
county. The amount of crime, gravity of the crimes committed,
prevalence of divorce, cost of living, unemployment rate, financial
resources, and numerous other factors combine to determine how
much funding and what type of staff positions are necessary.
Requiring proportionally similar staff positions in all judicial
districts, as the court ordered in Allegheny,'" could result in
overstaffing in some areas with a resultant waste of funds. Even
worse, it could cause understaffing in areas where the caseloads are
heaviest.
Similarly, the cost of living varies widely throughout
Pennsylvania. To standardize salaries, as Judge Montemuro
recommends,"5 would almost certainly result in salaries being
higher than necessary in some counties and lower than necessary
in others. As Chief Justice Nix warned in his Allegheny dissent,
some counties could find themselves unable to obtain competent
staffing-with disastrous results.16
Not only are the counties in a better position than state
bureaucrats to assess what their particular needs are and to develop
an appropriate budget, but they are also more motivated to
maintain an efficient court system. The relatively high level of
public scrutiny directed toward local officials often prompts them
to seek creative ways of keeping costs down. For instance,
Cumberland County takes advantage of the close proximity of 'The
Dickinson School of Law of The Pennsylvania State University to
reduce expenses by hiring two part-time law students for each
judge rather than one full-time clerk. Other counties are experi-
menting with merit-based pay increases in place of the traditional
automatic increases for government employees that can result in
the stagnation and mediocre personnel performance that too often
plague government bureaucracies.
104. Allegheny, 534 A.2d at 765.
105. See Montemuro, supra note 51, at 21.
106. See Allegheny, 534 A.2d at 767-68 (Nix, C.J., dissenting).
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Moreover, when funding decisions are made locally, the
counties can monitor any changes that occur within the jurisdiction
and quickly adjust the funding allocations accordingly to implement
swift changes in staffing, salary levels, and other expenditures. The
bureaucratic wheels of state government turn much slower.
It is also highly questionable whether centralizing and
standardizing all judicial functions, as the master's plan suggests,
will result in a more equal dispensation of justice. It is all too easy
to mistake equivalence for equality. Procedures throughout the
state do not need to be exactly the same in order to provide all
Pennsylvanians with equal access to the "evenhanded, unbiased and
competent justice" that the Allegheny decision demands. 7
Unification does not require uniformity, and diversity does not
always result in equality. Since each county has different needs,
why not assess their needs differently?
Nor is there anything inherently amiss in a system that permits
some local variation in practices. Eliminating all local rules, as
Justice Montemuro advocates,"8 will no doubt create consistency,
but at what expense? Local rules, after all, reflect how each
county, over the process of time and through trial and error, has
determined what works best in that community. Is it so onerous to
ask out-of-county attorneys to take a few minutes to acquaint
themselves with the local rules of a county prior to appearing
before its courts? Do we really want Pennsylvania's county courts
to be managed like a fast-food franchise, devoid of any local
control or flavor? Why shouldn't the folks in Potter County be
able to do things a little differently than those in Philadelphia?
Local rules are already subject to the approval of the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court." While this power of review does not
permit the court to dictate in detail how counties must perform all
their judicial functions, it does provide an adequate safeguard to
ensure that all counties are in compliance with the basic standards
of judicial administration.
In addition to these practical considerations, the prospect of a
state-wide funding system also raises controversial, politically
charged policy issues that deserve to be debated and hashed out in
107. Id. at 764.
108. See Montemuro, supra note 51, at 26-27.
109. See PA. STAT. ANN. fit, 42, §§ 2001-2004 (West 1995).
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the legislative forum. ' Foremost is the question of how to
allocate these costs. Should all Pennsylvania taxpayers contribute
equally to funding Pennsylvania's courts or should the residents of
each county be responsible for paying the costs of their own court
system? Should counties with low crime subsidize areas with heavy
crime? Should Pennsylvanians who reside where the cost of living
is low help fund court systems in areas where the costs are much
greater?
There is also the legitimate concern that counties with the
greatest political pull will end up with the lion's share of the
resources. In a state funded system, counties would essentially
compete against each other for funds. This could add an entirely
new layer of disharmony to the unified judicial system.
Finally, it is worth considering whether it would be wise to
bestow such a huge administrative burden on the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court which would ultimately oversee the system.'11 Do
we really want our high court justices to spend their time and
energy on the practical matters of budgets, personnel, and other
mundane administrative matters? Even if the justices are compe-
tent and capable administrators, their performance of such
functions may be inappropriate and unseemly. Perhaps such
matters are best left to the counties after all.
These are only a few of the difficult practical and policy
questions that arise when the management of judicial funding is
shifted from local to state control. All of these issues need to be
explored and addressed by the people of Pennsylvania through the
legislative process-not by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
E. Two Wrongs Don't Make a Right: The Limits of Stare Decisis
However obvious the shortcomings of the Allegheny decision,
it has attained the stature of precedent simply by being issued.
That raises the question of whether now, ten years later, the court
should uphold that decision on the basis of stare decisis alone. For
Justice Newman, who was not a member of the court when
Allegheny was decided, stare decisis is reason enough. After stating
that "an insufficient basis existed upon which this Court could
110. See Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. White Cross Stores, Inc., 199 A.2d 266, 267
(Pa. 1964) (stating that public policy matters are within the province of the General
Assembly).
111. Montemuro, supra note 51, at 18.
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determine that the statutory provisions for county funding of the
courts clearly, palpably and plainly violate the Constitution,"'1 2
she nonetheless went on to conclude that "[d]espite my reserva-
tions, I recognize that the rule of stare decisis requires that we
apply the holding .... ",,' By contrast, Justice Castille, in his
dissenting opinion, concluded:
[Although] the doctrine of stare decisis mandates that great
consideration be accorded to established precedent .... a
careful review of the [Allegheny] decision leads me to the
conviction that it was erroneously decided and will serve a great
injustice and that the rule of stare decisis should, in this
instance, be abandoned."4
Certainly the stare decisis doctrine is essential in order to
guarantee efficient, predictable, and uniform application of the law.
However, to blindly follow precedent without ever re-evaluating the
principles it stands for turns justices into little more than a flock of
sheep. Such a policy is neither wise nor just. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court itself has held:
The courts should not perpetrate error solely for the reason
that a previous decision although erroneous, has been rendered
on a given question. This is particularly true where no fixed
rights of property are involved or where great injustice or injury
will result by following the previous erroneous decision. If it is
wrong it should not be continued. Judicial honesty dictates
corrective action.115
Surely this is one of those instances where the court should
decline to apply stare decisis. Upholding the Allegheny mandate on
the basis of precedent alone adds insult to injury: First the court
seizes power from the General Assembly, and now it defends that
usurpation on the basis of precedent. Enforcing the mandate will
112. Pennsylvania State Ass'n of County Comm'rs v. Commonwealth, 681 A.2d 699,705-
06 (Pa. 1996) (Newman, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 706 (footnote omitted). In defense of her position, Justice Newman quoted
the following statement made by the United States Supreme Court on the importance of
following precedent: "[T]he very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution
requires such continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispens-
able." Id. at 706 n.4 (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
854 (1992)).
114. Id. at 709-10 (Castille, J., dissenting).
115, Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 199 A.2d at 268.
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not make that mandate right; it will merely perpetuate a decision
that was wrong in 1987 and is still wrong today.
F Some Co-equal Branches are More Equal Than Others:"6
The Superiority of the Supreme Court
By dividing governmental power between three co-equal
branches, the people of the United States hoped to protect
themselves from excessive power accumulation by any one branch.
In Pennsylvania, however, the Supreme Court has not always
honored the limits imposed on it by the separation of powers
doctrine. It has increasingly exceeded these limits and expanded
its power at the expense of the legislative branch. As a result, it
has emerged as perhaps the most powerful state supreme court in
the country.t ' The Allegheny mandate fits neatly into a pattern
of behavior in which the court has increasingly used the 1968
amendments to the Pennsylvania Constitution 8 to tip the bal-
ance of powers in its favor and isolate itself from the other two
branches to such an extent that it has become virtually unaccount-
able." 9
Prior to the enactment of these amendments, the court
permitted the General Assembly to pass laws that affected the
judicial branch so long as they did not impair the administration of
justice. 20 However, since the addition of article V, section 10(c)
to the Pennsylvania Constitution in 1968, which gave the court the
authority to enact rules governing all aspects of the judicial branch,
116, Cf. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 112 (1946).
117. See Mulcahey, supra note 5, at 552.
118. Article V, section 10(a) of the Pennsylvania Constitution states, in relevant part,
"The Supreme Court shall exercise general supervisory and administrative authority over all
the courts." PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(a). Article V, section 10(c) states:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules governing
practice, procedure and the conduct of all courts ... if such rules are consistent
with this Constitution and neither abridge, enlarge nor modify the substantive
rights of any litigant, nor affect the right of the General Assembly to determine
the jurisdiction of any court .... All laws shall be suspended to the extent that
they are inconsistent with rules prescribed under these provisions,
PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(c).
119. See generally Mulcahey, supra note 5; Charles G. Geyh, Highlighting a Low Point
on a High Court: Some Thoughts on the Removal of Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Rolf
Larsen and the Limits of Judicial Self-Regulation, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1041, 1054-63 (1995);
Melissa L. Walsh, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? Who Will Keep the Keepers?, 68 TEMP.
L. REV. 1527, 1529-40 (1995); Harry L. Witte, Judicial Selection in the People's Democratic
Republic of Pennsylvania: Here the People Rule?, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1079, 1121-30 (1995).
120. See Mulcahey, supra note 5, at 540-44.
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the court has amassed considerable power by declaring that the
provision awarded it exclusive control over all judicial rule-making,
even though the text of the constitution seems to indicate other-
wise."' The court has steadily increased its aggressiveness to the
point of claiming exclusive control over all matters relating to
judicial operations. In 1983, the court pronounced unconstitutional
the financial disclosure provisions of the Ethics Act insofar as they
apply to judges. The court categorically stated, "Legislation that
infringes on this Court's authority over courts is invalid.'
122
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has become so protective of
its administrative powers that it strikes down laws merely because
they affect the operation of the judicial branch in some manner.'
23
Neither the federal courts nor the vast majority of state courts have
asserted such authority.124 Examples of this almost obsessive
determination to hold exclusive control over judicial affairs include:
declaring unconstitutional the provision of the Public Agency Open
Meeting Law that made the law applicable to the supreme court
while exercising its rule-making authority;" enjoining a proposed
constitutional amendment concerning judicial discipline from being
placed on the ballot;126 affirming the superior court's decision
striking down a law forbidding attorneys from entering into
contingency fee contracts within fifteen days of a client's release
from a hospital because it intruded on the judiciary's right to
121. The final sentence of article V, section 10(c) of the Pennsylvania Constitution states,
"All laws shall be suspended to the extent that they are inconsistent with rules prescribed
under these provisions." Pa. Const. art. V, § 10(c). This sentence seems to anticipate the
legislature passing laws that affect court administration. See Geyh, supra note 119, at 1056-
61. See also Kotch v. Middle Coal Field Poor Dist., 197 A. 334, 399 (Pa. 1938) (stating that
the General Assembly has jurisdiction over all subjects on which legislation is not
prohibited); In re Likins' Petition, 72 A. 858, 860 (Pa. 1909) (stating that the legislature may
do whatever is not prohibited by the Constitution).
122. Kremer v. State Ethics Comm'n, 469 A.2d 593, 595-96 (Pa. 1983).
123. For discussions of the development and expansion of its power, see generally Geyh,
supra note 119; Mulcahey, supra note 5; Walsh, supra note 119, at 1529-40; Witte, supra note
119, at 1121-30.
124. In most states, as well as in the federal system, the legislature and the courts are
considered to have concurrent jurisdiction over judicial administration and rule-making. See
Geyh, supra note 119, at 1051 -55; Mulcahey, supra note 5, at 541-549; Witte, supra note 119,
at 1147.
125. This holding does not result from the resolution of a case before the court but is
expressed in a letter issued sua sponte from the court to the Governor, the President of the
Senate, and the Speaker of the House. See In re 42 Pa. C.S.S. 1703, 394 A.2d 444 (Pa. 1978).
126. See Kremer v. Grant, 606 A.2d 433, 434-35 (Pa. 1992).
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control the practice of law; 127 and affirming the commonwealth
court's ruling that the Public Employee Relations Act was
unconstitutional insofar as it imposed any limits on the power of
the courts to discharge employees." And, in May of 1997, in an
opinion written by Pennsylvania Supreme Court Chief Justice
Flaherty, the commonwealth court found that the ballot question
giving the General Assembly authority to enact laws providing
alternative ways for child victims to testify against their abductors
was essentially a proposal to amend the Pennsylvania Constitution
because the court alone had the power to make such decisions. 29
It is this virtually insatiable appetite for absolute control over
the judiciary that appears to be at the bottom of the Allegheny
decision. The current system deprives the court of exclusive power
over the judiciary because local funding means local control. But
in the highly-centralized, state-funded system designed by Judge
Montemuro at the request of the court, control over all judicial
administrative matters in all the county courts shifts to the
Administrative Office of the Pennsylvania Courts-and ultimately,
to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 3
Ironically, the court defended its Allegheny order as necessary
to protect the independence of the judiciary from the legislative
branch.' 3' In PSACC, the court attempted to justify the Alle-
127. See Lloyd v. Fishinger, 605 A.2d 1193, 1193-96 (Pa. 1992).
128. See Beckert v. American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees, 425 A.2d 859,
863-64 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981), aff'd, 459 A.2d 756 (Pa. 1983).
129. See Bergdoll v. Kane, 694 A.2d 1155, 1159 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997) (involving a
challenge to the ballot question that gained majority approval for a proposed amendment
to the Confrontation Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution). The question asked whether
(1) the phrase "meet the witness face to face" should be replaced with "confronted with the
witnesses against him" and (2) whether the General Assembly may enact laws regarding the
manner in which children may testify. Id. The court held that because the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court had been awarded exclusive control over judicial rule-making the question
involved two separate constitutional amendments but allowed only one answer; the court
declared the vote null and void. See id.
130. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (discussing what the state system entails).
131. In Allegheny the court stated, "[Jiudges must be free to hire competent staff, not
merely those referred by local political figures .... All courts must be free and independent
from the occasion of political influence and no court should even be perceived to be biased
in favor of local political authorities who pay the bills." County of Allegheny v. Common-
wealth, 534 A.2d 760, 765 (Pa. 1987). In PSACC, the court explicitly stated: "[Alt issue is
the continued existence of an independent judiciary." Pennsylvania State Ass'n of County
Comm'rs v. Commonwealth, 682 A.2d 699, 703 (Pa. 1996).
There is a double irony in the court asserting the independence of the judiciary as
justification for its decision. The four justices who voted with the majority in Alle-
gheny-Justices Flaherty, Larsen, Zappala, and Papadakos-are all from Allegheny County
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gheny mandate by citing cases in which counties that failed to
adequately fund their courts were ordered by appellate courts to do
so.'32 In Allegheny, however, lack of adequate funding was not
the problem. The controversy did not even involve a fight between
a county and its court. Instead, the county was suing the state in
an attempt to free itself from the funding responsibility imposed
upon it and shift that burden onto the state 3 3  There is a big
difference between directing a legislative body to fulfill its obliga-
tion to fund the courts when it is not already doing so and directing
the legislature to change the method of funding.34 The former
is a defensive action to protect the independence of the judiciary.
The latter is an offensive move that claims the power to decide a
mauer assigned to the General Assembly.
The fact that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court viewed the
current court funding system as a threat to its independence
indicates that its idea of judicial independence goes far beyond
being free from legislative encroachment and domination. T, the
court, judicial independence apparently means the freedom to
exercise exclusive control over all administrative matters affecting
the courts despite the fact that such power is not granted by the
Pennsylvania Constitution.'
Judicial independence is a basic precept of our form of
government.36 Without it, courts could not dispense justice or
protect the constitution from violation by the other two branches.
Such independence, however, does not mean total isolation to the
point of unaccountability. In fact, the separation of powers
doctrine provides for an intermingling of powers such that each
and could not have been elected without the help of the Democratic Party that has long
controlled Allegheny County government. See Bruce Ledewitz, What's Really Wrong with
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 32 DuQ. L. REV. 409, 427 n.117 (1994).
132. See PSACC, 681 A.2d at 702-03. Under the doctrine of inherent powers, courts may
do whatever is necessary to ensure that they are free to carry out their duties unimpeded by
another branch. See Beckert v. Warren, 439 A.2d 638, 642-43. See generally Stephen P.
Drexler, Recent Decisions, 32 DUQ. L. REV. 627, 630-34 (1994) (discussing prior cases
involving court funding disputes).
133. See Allegheny, 534 A.2d at 768 (Nix, C.J., dissenting); see also Ledewitz, supra note
131, at 428.
134. See Allegheny, 534 A.2d at 766 (Nix, C., dissenting).
135. See supra note 121 and accompanying text
136, See 'iE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 464-72 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (discussing the importance of an independent judiciary). See also Sweeney v. Tucker,
375 A,2d 698, 705 (Pa. 1977).
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branch has the ability to keep the others from exceeding their
constitutional limits."'
'The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, seems to view the
separation of powers quite differently. It appears to desire
complete freedom from the restrictions built into the balance of
powers structure that keeps the judiciary in check. The court has
previously interpreted the Pennsylvania Constitution in such a
manner as to prohibit the General Assembly from legislating on
matters concerning the judiciary. Now, with Allegheny, it has gone
even further and is attempting to dictate to the General Assembly
precisely which legislation it must enact.
G. A Kinder, Gentler Court: Louisiana Did it with Deference
When the State of Louisiana was faced with a case similar to
Allegheny, it avoided a crisis because Louisiana's courts respected
the boundaries imposed by the separation of powers doctrine and
refused to intrude on the domain of the legislature. In Twenty-First
Judicial District Court v. State ex rel. Guste,138 the judges of a
local district court sought a declaratory judgment that the statutes
requiring local governments ("parishes") to fund part of their
operating expenses were unconstitutional. 39 The judges argued
that due to the dire state of the local parish's finances, a funding
crisis was likely to occur which would result in the court's having
insufficient operating funds."4 Therefore, they argued, failure by
the state to fund the court's operation denied the people access to
the courts and the right to due process of law. 4' The judges cited
Allegheny to support their assertion that the funding scheme was
unconstitutional because it produced a fragmented system. 4 The
Louisiana Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment for
the defendants, finding that the legislature had been granted
discretion over state expenditures and that the plaintiffs had failed
to show that the present system violated the Louisiana Constitu-
137. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 264-71 (James Madison) (discussing intermingled
powers in the United States Constitution).
138. 563 So. 2d 1185 (La. Ct. App. 1990), writ denied, 568 So. 2d 1082 (La, 1990).
139. See generally id.
140. See id. at 1193-94.
141. See id. at 1191-92.
142. See id. at 1192.
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tion."' The court of appeal also noted that if in the future the
lower court actually lacks the necessary funds to operate, it may file
a writ of mandamus to compel such funding.'" The Louisiana
Supreme Court denied certiorari.'45 Thus, the Louisiana courts
honored the presumption that statutes are constitutionally valid and
held the challengers to a high standard of proof to show otherwise.
The judiciary, therefore, protected the right of its sister branch to
decide such matters.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, by contrast, not only failed
to accord proper deference to the General Assembly, but even
denied both of its sister branches the opportunity for input.'
46
Had the Pennsylvania Supreme Court showed the same respect for
the separation of powers doctrine and the same deference to the
legislature shown by Louisiana courts, Pennsylvania would not be
faced with the prospect of an ugly power struggle between two
coordinate branches of their government.
III. Resolving the Crisis
A. Showdown In Pennsylvania: The Court Makes Its Mandate
Mandatory
After standing silent for nine years while the General Assem-
bly ignored its mandate, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court finally
declared war. In PSACC, the court expressed impatience with the
General Assembly and demonstrated its intent to enforce the
mandate.47 In addition to ordering the General Assembly to
enact a state-wide funding scheme by January 1, 1998, the court
appointed Senior Judge and former Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Justice Frank Montemuro as special master. Judge Montemuro was
to prepare recommendations to the court designing the new system
and developing a plan for the transition.'
143. See Twenty-First Judicial Dist. C., 563 So. 2d at 1191. While it is true that the
Louisiana Constitution does not specify a "unified judicial system," that is hardly a
distinction that makes a difference since, as discussed earlier, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's use of the word "unify" was unjustified. See supra text accompanying notes 69-82.
144. See Twenty-First Judicial Dist. Ct., 563 So. 2d at 1192.
145. See Twenty-first Judicial Dist. Ct. v. State ex rel. Guste, 568 So. 2d 1082 (La. 1990).
146. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text (denying the legislature an opportunity
for input).
147. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.




The PSACC decision spurred a legislative response, but not
the type that the court had wanted. Many legislators publicly
expressed anger and outrage. Some vowed non-compliance.1
49
Others suggested retaliating by ending elections of appellate judges
and switching to an appointment system."
A top legislative aid predicted legislative efforts to change the
state's constitution to curtail the power of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court.' Some legislators went so far as to suggest
amending Pennsylvania's budget to specifically state that Judge
Montemuro's study would not be funded.'52 Others suggested
changing the constitution to state specifically that a unified judicial
system does not require a state-wide funding system.153 Finally,
there have been rumors of impeaching the justices who voted with
the majority in PSACC.5 4
Is this just political posturing, or will the General Assembly
stand its constitutional ground? We will soon learn the answer as
the budget debates begin and the Legislature is forced to either
approve or reject Governor Tom Ridge's funding request for Phase
One of the takeover.
B. Is There Muscle Behind the Mandate? Can the Court
Enforce its Order?
If the General Assembly simply refuses the court funding line
item and does not pass legislation in compliance with the court's
mandate, the court could find it in contempt. Whether the court
could successfully impose sanctions to compel obedience, however,
is another question. Under the doctrine of legislative immunity,
legislators are protected from liability for legislative acts. The
purpose of this principle, which has existed since the founding of
our country,15 5 is to ensure that the exercise of legislative power
149. See Inside the Capitol, PATRIOT-NEWS (Harrisburg), Aug. 6, 1996, at 137; State
Ordered to Fund County Courts, MORNING CALL (Allentown), July 27, 1996, at A3.
150. Robert Zausner & Russell E. Eshelman, Report: State Will Be Told to Fund Bill,
PATRIOT-NEWS (Harrisburg), Apr. 14, 1996, at Al.
151. See id.
152, See Inside the Capitol, supra note 149, at B7.
153. See Stephanie Ebbert, Ignored Court Tab Shocks Capitol, PATRIOT-NEws (Harris-
burg), Apr. 21, 1996, at BI; Legislature Must Find Court Funds, MORNING CALL
(Allentown), Apr. 16, 1996, at A16.
154. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
155. See Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372 (1951).
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is not hampered by the threat of a lawsuit. 56 This protection
stems from the Speech and Debate Clause of the United States
Constitution 57 and is contained in the Pennsylvania Constitution
as well. 58 While the doctrine normally protects legislators from
suits to compel legislative action,59 it does not necessarily bar a
court from ordering a legislature to enact legislation to remedy a
constitutional defect.
Legislative immunity is not absolute." It shields legislators
from liability for activities that fall within the "legitimate legislative
sphere."'61 It is not a license to violate the constitution or break
the law.'62 Thus, in PSACC, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
justified its order compelling legislative action by explaining:
A lawsuit to compel legislative action normally would be barred
by the speech and debate clause. Litigants may not sue in court
to compel the legislature to enact a law. In this case, however,
where the legislature has been directed by this court to act in
order to remedy a constitutional defect ... the legislature is not
insulated from suit by the speech and debate clause.63
The same argument could be advanced in support of a
contempt order because blatant violation of a court order would
hardly fall within the "legitimate legislative sphere."'" Indeed,
156. See id See also, Robert A. Schapiro, The Legislative Injunction: A Remedy for
Unconstitutional Legislative Inaction, 99 YALE L.J. 231, 238-40 (1989).
157. "[F]or any speech or debate in either House, they [the legislators] shall not be
questioned in any other Place," U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. 1. The United States Supreme
Court extended this immunity to local legislative bodies. See Lake Country Estates, Inc. v.
Tahoe Reg. Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 404-405 (1979); Supreme Court of Va. v.
Consumers Union of United States, 446 U.S. 719, 731-34 (1980). See also Kristine L.
Donabedian, Legislation-Legislative Immunity Shields Local Legislators from Contempt
Sanctions, Spallone v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 625 (1990), 24 SUFFOLK U. L, REV. 882, 884-
88 (1990).
158. "[For any speech or debate in either House, they [the legislators] shall not be
questioned in any other place." PA. CONST. art. II., § 15.
159. See Pennsylvania State Ass'n of County Comm'rs v. Commonwealth, 681 A.2d 699,
702 (Pa. 1996) (citing Consumers Educ. and Protective Ass'n v. Nolan, 368 A.2d 675, 680-81
(Pa. 1977)).
160. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 503 (1969).
161. Consumers Educ. and Protective Ass'n, 368 A.2d at 680-81; Consumers Union, 446
U.S. at 732. See also Schapiro, supra note 156, at 240-43.
162. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,506 (1978) (stating that all government officials
must obey the law); U.S. CONST. art. VI ("[Tlhe Members of the several State Legisla-
tures ... shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution .. .
163. PSACC, 681 A.2d at 702.
164. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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the duty imposed on every citizen to obey the laws, the constitu-
tion, and court orders should also apply to individual legisla-
tors.65 As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court correctly pointed out
in PSACC: "The Speech and Debate clause does not insulate the
legislative branch to act in accord with the Constitution."" The
judiciary's power to compel the General Assembly to enact
legislation to cure a constitutional defect is a natural corollary to
the power to strike down statutes that violate the constitution. If
a court has the ability to issue such an order, it should certainly be
able to enforce it by imposing contempt sanctions.
While it seems clear that a court can, in extreme circumstances,
issue an order compelling a legislature to enact legislation and
impose contempt sanctions on that body as a whole if it does not
comply,167 the issue of whether a court can impose sanctions on
the individual legislators is more problematic. In Spallone v. United
States, the United States Supreme Court struck down contempt
sanctions imposed by a federal district court on city council
members who refused to vote in favor of an ordinance that would
cure a civil rights violation."6 The United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York had found that the City of
Yonkers had intentionally violated the Fourteenth Amendment
through a racially discriminatory housing plan that restricted low
income housing projects to a specific area of the city. 69 The
court then ordered the city to enact legislation to cure the viola-
tion. 7 When the City Council refused to pass legislation to
change the zoning, the district court imposed financial sanctions
against the dissenting legislators and ordered their imprisonment
after the tenth day of non-compliance. 7' The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the sanctions, but reduced the fines.
1 72
The United States Supreme Court, however, ruled that the district
court had abused its discretion in imposing the sanction on the
individual City Council members. 3
165. See Spalione v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 300-06 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
166. PSACC, 681 A.2d at 703.
167. See Spallone, 493 U.S. at 266-67.
168. See id. at 266.
169. See United States v, Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 635 F. Supp. 1577 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
170. See id. at 1577.
171. See Spallone, 493 U.S. at 268-73 (complete background of the case).
172. See Spallone v. United States, 856 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1987), rev'd, 493 U.S. 265
(1990).
173. See Spallone, 493 U.S. at 267.
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Spallone does not mean that individual legislators can never be
held personally responsible for their actions. Although the Court
did strike down the sanctions imposed on the City Council
members, the Court's main concern was that the district court did
not first seek to secure compliance by imposing sanctions against
the city alone. Only after that failed, the court reasoned, should
the question of imposing contempt sanctions against the individual
council members even have been considered.174 Moreover,
Justice Brennan argued in a strong dissent, joined by Justices
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, that once the lower court had
found that the city was in violation of the Constitution and had
issued a remedial order, the council members became obliged to
obey it and could not rely on the doctrine of legislative immunity
to protect them.'75 As Justice Brennan stated in his dissent in
Spallone, "When necessary, courts levy personal contempt sanctions
against other types of state and local officials for flouting valid
court orders, and I see no reason to treat local legislators differ-
ently when they are acting outside their 'sphere of legitimate
legislative activity.
'", 76
However, even if a contempt order against the Pennsylvania
legislators in their individual capacities was constitutionally
justifiable, it is unlikely that such an order would be carried out.
Because courts must rely on the executive branch to implement
their orders, an uncooperative president or governor can render
judicial decisions essentially worthless. America's fourth Supreme
Court Chief Justice, John Marshall, was rudely awakened to this
reality in 1835 when President Andrew Jackson sent troops to drive
Native American tribes out of Georgia even though the Supreme
Court had ruled that the tribes had a right to the land and could
not be forced from it.'77 A defiant President Jackson demon-
strated the limits of the separation of powers doctrine by reportedly
exclaiming, "John Marshall has rendered his decision; now let him
174. See id. at 280. The Court found that this approach was necessary in order to comply
with the doctrine that a court must exercise the least possible power necessary to achieve the
proposed end. See Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 371 (1966).
175. See Spallone, 493 U.S. at 301 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Tenney v. Bradhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376
(1951)).
177. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia,
3! U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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enforce it." ' It is highly likely that Pennsylvania Governor Tom
Ridge would similarly refuse to enforce a contempt order issued by
Pennsylvania's Supreme Court upon the General Assembly.
C. Defiance v. Compliance: Should the Legislature Fight Back or
Back Down?
Whether the General Assembly could violate the Allegheny
mandate with impunity is one question; whether it should do so is
quite another. Unfortunately, there will be negative consequences
no matter what the General Assembly does or does not do.
Disobeying the order could undermine the iPtegrity of the court
and seriously weaken the judicial branch, but obeying the order
could unduly strengthen the judiciary by permitting it to retain
wrongfully acquired power.
The reluctance of the General Assembly to enact the required
legislation is certainly due in part to the legislators' correct
assessment that the court has violated the separation of powers
doctrine and intruded upon their domain. In addition, the
legislators are far from eager to assume responsibility for raising
the estimated $1 billion needed to fund Pennsylvania's courts.179
Naturally, they would prefer to leave this financial burden with the
counties so that the local officials are the ones who must impose
taxes and suffer the political consequences. Therefore, legislators
have searched for a way to avoid a direct confrontation with the
court while, at the same time, escaping the responsibility of raising
the needed funds. Several proposals have emerged.
178. Kevin J. Worthen & Wayne P. Farnsworth, Who Will Control the Future of Indian
Gaming?, 407 BYU L. REV. 407, 448 n.71 (1996) (quoting GRANT FOREMAN, INDIAN
REMOVAL: THE EMIGRATION OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES OF INDIANS 235 (2d ed.
1953)).
179. The total cost of funding Pennsylvania's courts of common pleas depends on which
county employees and offices would be included as part of the "unified judicial system."
Curiously enough, Judge Montemuro's report does not even provide a ball-park estimate of
how much his plan would cost. Pennsylvania Senate Appropriations Chairman Richard
Tilghman estimated the amount at $1 billion. See State Ordered to Fund County Courts,
supra note 149, at A3. An anonymous legislative aid criticized that estimate as being too
high, but stated that the cost "certainly could reach $750 million." Zausner & Eshelman,
supra note 150, at Al. Other newspaper reports have set the amount at "nearly $1 billion,"
"Professionalized" System Said Needed, PATRIOT-NEWS (Harrisburg), Apr. 17,1996, at B9;
and "ranging from $500 million to $1 billion ... ,." Ebbert, supra note 153, at B1. In 1987,
at the time the Allegheny decision was rendered, the cost of funding the county courts was
estimated to be $239,000,000. See County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth, 534 A.2d 760,768
n.3 (Pa. 1987) (Nix, J., dissenting).
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Under one plan, the state would reimburse the counties for
court expenses but would not be involved in developing or
approving the budgets. All administrative responsibility would
remain at the local level; the state would do little more than pay
the bills. As Judge Montemuro acknowledged in his report, this
scheme is preferred by the majority of president judges and local
officials."8 However, Montemuro has rejected the plan because
it merely "changes bankers," and does not in his opinion provide
sufficient standardization to meet the definition of a unified judicial
system."'
The General Assembly could also create a compromise
whereby a small number of judicial employees would be transferred
to the state system, while the bulk would remain under county
control. This plan would hardly comply with the gist of the
mandate, but might satisfy the court if the court were convinced
that its order was unenforceable.
Another option is for the General Assembly to initiate an
effort to amend the Pennsylvania Constitution to state explicitly
that the unified judicial system does not require state-wide funding.
After all, this solution is the constitutionally acceptable means for
a legislature to effectively overturn a court's interpretation of a
constitution. However, constitutional amendments are neither
quick nor easy to pass.
All of these suggested solutions are superficially attractive
because they avoid an immediate confrontation between the two
branches. However, they are unacceptable because they do not
correct the constitutional infraction that the supreme court
committed. Permitting such a blatant usurpation of power from a
co-equal branch to go unchallenged is a dangerous precedent to set.
Any peace achieved through such a compromise could prove to be
illusory-a temporary cease-fire that would last only until the court
again oversteps the constitutional boundary line. After all, this is
not the first time that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has used its
power of judicial review to usurp power from the legislature,"
and it probably will not be the last. As long as the court lacks
proper judicial restraint and is unwilling to accord due deference to
180. See Montemuro, supra note 51, at 12-13.
181, Id.




its sister branches, the people of Pennsylvania are constantly in
danger of what Justice Castille has termed "judicial tyranny.
183
The General Assembly has a duty to all Pennsylvanians to
stand firm against attacks by a coordinate branch in violation of the
separation of powers doctrine. This doctrine must be respected at
all costs because it prevents one branch from amassing excessive
power and ensures that all the branches will exercise only those
powers constitutionally granted to them by the people."8 When
one branch aggresses against another and will not retreat, the other
branches must employ the weapons provided to them by the
constitution. They must restore the balance of powers by returning
the errant branch to its proper position.
The people of Pennsylvania have given the General Assembly
the authority to determine funding matters. 85 To allow that
power to be usurped by the judiciary is to violate the will of the
people as expressed in the Pennsylvania Constitution. Moreover,
by placing this decision in the hands of the General Assembly, the
people of Pennsylvania have essentially reserved it for themselves.
It is our right to make this decision that the court has seized. And
it is the General Assembly's duty to restore that right.
Unfortunately, a legislative refusal to obey the mandate, as
suggested by this comment, would not be without negative
consequences. Aside from the unpleasantness of a potentially nasty
and drawn-out battle between the court and the General Assembly,
it is also possible that the court's authority, credibility, and integrity
would be undermined. Will the court become unable to enforce its
orders? If the legislature ignores this mandate, will it also ignore
similar orders in the future? Should we permit legislatures to
choose which orders they will follow and which they will not? Or
is that too a violation of the separation of powers doctrine?
Undoubtedly these are troubling questions. However, they are
no more disturbing than the prospect of a court that freely usurps
legislative power by nullifying legislation it happens to dislike; that
is the threat presently confronting us. Ironically, sometimes a
violation is necessary to cure a violation. Because courts are to be
183. Pennsylvania State Ass'n of County Comm'rs v. Commc':-.wlth, 681 A.2d 699, 709
(Pa. 1996) (Castille, J., dissenting).
184. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at
320 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
185. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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the final interpreters of the constitution, 86 their decisions must
ordinarily be followed. But in the rare and unfortunate case where
a court has blatantly misinterpreted the constitution, its order must
be disobeyed.
The court's power of judicial review gives it the authority and
duty to cure constitutional violations committed by the legislative
branch. When the court uses that power for any other reason, it
has exceeded the authority granted to it by the constitution. Such
orders are therefore unauthorized. Like unconstitutional laws,
improper orders should be considered void.
IV. Conclusion
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's unjustified intrusion into
the legislative domain has brought Pennsylvania to the brink of a
constitutional crisis. In declaring the current system of court
funding unconstitutional and ordering the General Assembly to
enact a state funded system, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
used its power of judicial review to usurp power that has been
granted to the General Assembly by the Pennsylvania Constitution.
The General Assembly has responded with defiance and threats of
retaliation. If neither side gives in, these two sister branches of
government will find themselves caught in an ugly power struggle
that could undermine the integrity and credibility of both. The
hostility and strife that will inevitably result from such a confronta-
tion could seriously impair the stability of Pennsylvania's govern-
ment for years to come.
Since the court is the wrongful aggressor, it should revoke its
mandate. If the court insists on enforcing the order, then the
General Assembly must stand firm and refuse to comply with it.
The judicial branch has been entrusted to defend the constitution
from violations by other branches, and its orders must ordinarily be
obeyed. But when the court itself violates the constitution, then
the other branches must rise to the constitution's defense.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court obviously prefers a state
funded judiciary. That decision, however, is not for the court to
make. It has been assigned to the General Assembly. The court
had no authority to interfere with the legislature's right to make
that determination.
186. See Commonwealth v. Zasloff, 13 A.2d 67, 69 (Pa. 1940).
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Perhaps, after extensive study and debate, the people of
Pennsylvania will conclude that the funding method should be
changed. But that decision, along with all of the practical consider-
ations and public policy issues it entails, should be made by the
people, acting through their elected representatives-not dictated
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
Dana Stuchell
